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The ‘Rojava Revolution’ in 
Syrian Kurdistan: A Model of 
Development for the Middle East?
Can Cemgil and Clemens Hoffmann 
Abstract As the civil war in Syria continues, in the territory of Rojava – 
in Kurdish, ‘the West’ – the northern Syrian Kurdish political movement 
is attempting to implement ‘libertarian municipalism’, based on the 
thoughts of United States (US) anarchist Murray Bookchin. Since 
the withdrawal of Syrian regime forces in 2012, the movement has 
consolidated significant territorial gains as a US ally in the anti-Islamic 
State (IS) struggle, while simultaneously securing Russian support. Viewed 
with suspicion by Turkey, Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, the geopolitical 
conditions of Rojava’s emergence are its greatest impediment. This article 
analyses Rojava’s model of rule and socioeconomic development, and its 
theory and practice in the context of the civil war, and regional Middle 
Eastern and wider global geopolitics. It reflects on Rojava’s place and 
meaning for contemporary geopolitics in the Middle East, and considers 
the territory’s prospects, discussing its transformative potential for an 
otherwise troubled region. 
1 Introduction: locating Rojava among many alternatives
The current global financial, regional geopolitical and environmental 
crises, are all thought to coincide and express themselves in the 
most vicious forms in the contemporary Middle East. Historically, 
hydrocarbon developmentalism, rentierism, recurrent crises and conflict 
have characterised the region. Authoritarian militarist-bureaucratic 
rule through clientelist networks, fuelled by oil rents re-invested in arms 
purchases, has long characterised the whole region. This entrenched 
militarist authoritarianism is exacerbated by the effects of  large top-
down hydro-civilizational projects (irrigation, dam building), bloated 
bureaucracies, and neoliberal policies that have led to new forms of  
land appropriation and environmental degradation, all of  which have 
contributed to the region’s problematic ‘development’ template. 
Despite this declared regional specificity of  the Middle East, alternative, 
critical concepts of  development and governance are frequently 
conceived at the global and universal levels (e.g. Radcliffe 2015). They 
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start by developing alternative macro-policies that are subsequently 
implemented through national centralised governments, which turn 
them into local social realities. ‘Sustainable development’, but also more 
radical movements such as ‘de-growth’ (e.g. D’Alisa et al. 2014) and 
similar concepts, while offering to re-think the parameters of  global 
growth and development, do so within established global macro-
political settings where institutionally supported notions, notably those 
of  the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, are located in – 
rather than on top of  – a geopolitically fragmented system of  nation 
states indispensable to the formulation and implementation of  policy 
alternatives. 
National, centralised states act as interlocutors of  a globally formulated 
developmental ‘consensus’, as well as implementing it. Similarly, states 
are important fields of  struggle, though alternatives are still developed 
within national confines. Looking at development in holistic and 
geographically expansive terms, and changing policies to reflect where 
power actually lies in the state, is certainly imperative. But there is also 
a more problematic element in this dominant strategy: by changing 
developmental notions, strategies and policies in the current universal 
structures, most alternatives also emulate and, thereby, reproduce, 
top-down approaches. Even ‘participatory development’ (e.g. Cooke and 
Kothari 2001) depends on hierarchically organised national–territorial 
developmental states and the international organisations they form as 
the interlocutors. 
This article will present and interrogate a yet more radical departure 
from the developmental mainstream, relating its abstract formulation 
to its lived practice in a peculiar geopolitical setting: that of  a local, 
anti-authoritarian, anti-hierarchical and communitarian approach, 
as well as its current social practice in the northern Syrian Kurdish 
enclaves, or cantons, of  Rojava. Based on the theories of  Bookchin, a US 
thinker frequently labelled ‘eco-anarchist’, the Rojava model is a radical 
departure from the hierarchical global growth regime. This ‘democratic 
confederalism’ or ‘libertarian municipalism’, entails elements such as 
community-based, cooperative production and trade as social ecology, 
radical gender equality, and local forms of  direct democratic political rule. 
The following study is based on secondary research into the foundations 
and realities of  Rojava, using personal accounts, reports, academic 
articles and journalistic sources. It will first set out the ideological and 
philosophical foundations of  this revolutionary project in Bookchin’s 
work, before elaborating on the historic and geopolitical conditions of  
its emergence. It will then provide an overview of  the social structure 
and lived reality of  this political and socioeconomic project. It will close 
by arguing that the very conditions of  the project’s emergence – the 
contemporary crisis-ridden geopolitical conjuncture – are at the same 
time the greatest threat to it, not so much externally but due to the 
potential internal contradictions of  a militarised society. 
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2 From Bookchin to Öcalan: democratic confederalism and the Rojava 
‘revolution’
This alternative project of  development and democracy owes its 
intellectual sources and political inspiration to Bookchin. It was 
Bookchin’s social historical theory that inspired the intellectual and 
strategic transformation of  the Kurdish Liberation Movement (KLM) 
after imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah 
Öcalan read his work. Like Bookchin himself, Öcalan was disillusioned 
with the orthodox tradition of  Marxist-Leninist party organisation and 
underwent a series of  transformations even before he was imprisoned 
(Üstündağ 2016). 
The PKK reflected these changes in a series of  congresses in the 1990s 
and 2000s, and changed its orientation and strategies accordingly from 
a separatist–nationalist movement to a democratic autonomist and 
democratic confederalist movement (Güneş 2012). Akkaya, Jongerden 
and Şimşek (2015) described it as a transformation from rebellion 
to reconstruction. Surprisingly though, this intellectual and strategic 
transformation of  the KLM did not materialise in Turkey, its birthplace, 
but in neighbouring Syria, following the outbreak of  civil war in 
2011. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian affiliate and 
sister organisation of  the PKK, seized the opportunity to implement 
Bookchin’s ideas in Rojava.
Bookchin’s theoretical contribution to studies on ecology, development, 
freedom and citizenship, among other areas, consists of  a diverse, 
sophisticated, yet at times incoherent and factually unsubstantiated 
(White 2008) body of  ideas brought together in a series of  volumes.1 
The central thread, however, is clear: disillusioned with vulgar versions 
of  Marxism and what Bookchin calls ‘lifestyle anarchism’ (Bookchin 
1995), he sets out to offer a sweeping social and ideological history 
that specifies ‘hierarchy’ almost as the source of  all social, political and 
ecological evils. A concept broader than all other forms of  domination, 
be they the contemporary state, class domination, or human domination 
over nature, hierarchy is also antecedent to these ills of  society. 
Freedom, then, consists of  overcoming these hierarchical relations 
and establishing relations based on ‘equality of  unequals’, social 
complementarity, and access for everyone to an irreducible minimum of  
needs that they themselves define (Bookchin 1982). 
Abolition of  social hierarchy will also result in repairing the ‘metabolic 
rift’ (Foster 1999) that Marx declared ‘irreparable’ under capitalism 
(Marx 1981: 949). Marx attributed the separation of  human beings 
from nature to the rise of  capitalism, which resulted in soil exhaustion 
and the impossibility of  bioregionalism (i.e. producing crops locally 
and sustainably for decentralised markets) in the context of  expanding 
urban centres, industrial production and their ever-increasing demands 
on nature, and argued that this was an irreparable rift under capitalism. 
While in agreement, Bookchin saw capitalism only as one manifestation of  
domination, that is class domination, among others such as gerontocracy 
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and patriarchy, and accordingly believed that human domination of  nature 
was the result of  social domination in general and could be done away 
with only when social hierarchy was completely abolished.
While Bookchin is unwilling to suggest a determinate way to bring about 
this large-scale social and environmental change, he traces historically 
and proposes theoretically what he calls the ‘legacies of  freedom’ that 
we inherited from ‘organic societies’, which knew no hierarchy and had 
an ‘ecological sensibility’ as well as an intuitive and practical knowledge 
of  freedom (Bookchin 1982). Distinguishing between ancient Greek 
participatory democracy and Roman republicanism (Bookchin 1987: 
43), Bookchin argues that the republican model with its representative 
system slides into a de-socialised elite rule, and creates professional 
rulers who govern, rather than administer (Bookchin 1982: 129) in an 
exclusive political space (Cemgil 2016). To socialise the political and 
to politicise the social (Üstündağ 2016), Bookchin argued for direct 
democracy starting at the most local level, building up a confederation of  
libertarian municipalities that are, just like members of  ‘organic societies’, 
interdependent and cooperative. The representative state in its current 
form, ‘absorbed’ administrative social functions and made itself  ‘as 
indispensable as an organising principle for human consociation’ (Bookchin 
1982: 127), becoming a major source of  domination (Cemgil 2016). 
Direct democratic participation entails the social administration of  
production and need determination as its corollary. Social administration 
of  production requires a localised, decentralised economy, scaled down 
to ‘human dimensions’ (Bookchin 1982: 344), with various libertarian 
municipalities cooperating if  they decide to do so. While decentralisation 
enhances direct democratic participation it does not necessarily exclude 
the possibility of  forms of  local social hierarchy, and Bookchin is 
well aware of  this. In any case, democratic processes might generate 
hierarchies as well. That is why he proposes a confederation of  libertarian 
municipalities, in the final analysis, in the belief  that a municipality that 
generated domination would be checked by others, besides internal 
democratic checks and balances (Biehl and Bookchin 1998: 108). 
A democratised economy and polity also allow for the determination of  
needs of  the community by the democratic processes of  the community. 
Rather than being expressed in objective categories, those involved also 
determine needs. The democratisation and de-centralisation of  social 
administrative functions that we now call economy, and scaling it down 
to human dimensions, would also reduce dependence on hydrocarbons 
through de-industrialisation, without dismissing the possibility of  
interdependent self-sufficiency. 
Among Bookchin’s primary aims in writing these numerous treatises 
on domination was the concern to offer a social ecology that 
re-constructs human–nature relations. Organic societies, for Bookchin, 
did not see nature an externality to be controlled. The emergence of  
institutionalised hierarchy and social domination, however, also resulted 
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in the emergence of  the notion of  dominating nature. The language of  
domination of  nature became so strong with the advent of  capitalism 
that even radical critics of  capitalism, such as Marx, fell prey to its 
ideology at times. The mending of  the metabolic rift requires a full-scale 
subjective as well as material transformation of  relations, though. 
Calls for bioregionalism, decentralisation or autarchy will not by 
themselves resolve the apocalyptic future that awaits us. Nor will 
anti-consumerism or de-industrialisation. A full-scale struggle against 
domination and hierarchy is needed and an ecological society can only be 
built on non-hierarchical relations. A self-sufficient interdependence within 
the democratic confederation of  libertarian municipalities, usufructory 
or use-oriented property relations in municipalities, direct democratic 
policymaking in all areas of  social life, as well as a subjective and material 
transformation in human–nature and human–human relations to erase 
hierarchy, are preconditions for such transition (Bookchin 1982).
Bookchin insists that if  hierarchy and domination are the root causes 
of  all social ills, then a genuine transformation into an ecological, 
libertarian society must take aim at all of  their manifestations. Among 
primordial forms of  domination is men’s domination over women, 
which grew organically, according to Bookchin, but then became 
institutionalised into a perennial patriarchal domination. Building on 
Bookchin’s social ecology, Biehl (1991) concurred that this primordial 
form of  domination must be destroyed along with all others, and 
added that women must make use of  their full potential by liberating 
themselves from the trap of  the oikos; that is, their domestic roles. While 
these activities have naturally emerged in the form of  childbearing 
and childrearing, women’s domination by men originates from women 
being exclusively associated with these roles. For Biehl, rather than 
seeking an expanded oikos in the polis, women should actively engage in 
liberatory politics in the polis (1991: 154), for ‘humanity… has greater 
potentialities than caring and nurturing’ (1991: 26). 
What most informed the KLM’s view on women and their liberation, 
however, were Öcalan’s writings. Öcalan set the liberation of  women as 
the precondition of  the liberation of  society in general and the liberation 
of  Kurds in particular. Drawing on Bookchin’s social-historical account 
of  patriarchal domination and hierarchy, Öcalan suggests that women 
have the capacity and will not only to participate in and revolutionise the 
democratic process, but also to create their own institutions to empower 
themselves. For this purpose, he proposed the notion of  Jineolojî, the 
science of  woman and life, which aimed to provide an alternative view 
of  social reality from the perspective of  self  definition and actualisation 
of  woman in social life (Öcalan 2013). 
Öcalan first familiarised himself  with the work of  Bookchin when he 
was serving a life sentence on the prison island of  İmralı in Turkey. 
Bookchin’s work so fascinated Öcalan that by 2005 he was steering the 
strategic orientation of  the KLM towards democratic confederalism 
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(Jongerden and Akkaya 2013). Building on Bookchin’s work, Öcalan 
saw capitalism, the nation state and patriarchy as the root causes of  all 
social and ecological problems under conditions of  capitalist modernity. 
A social revolution, for Öcalan, must do away with these three elements 
of  capitalist modernity and replace them with democratic modernity. 
Along with ethical and philosophical motivations, and his personal 
disillusionment with Marxist and nationalist positions, one could 
reasonably claim that Öcalan’s adoption and adaption of  Bookchin’s 
perspective in the case of  the KLM was partly due to long-term 
strategic considerations that in great part stem from the Kurds’ social 
and geographical reality. Having been territorially dispersed among 
four states –Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran – the Kurds have been fighting 
these states in a bid to gain independence or autonomy in a federal 
system. If  as nation states these four countries have been responsible for 
all the Kurds’ suffering, reasoned Öcalan, why would the Kurds want to 
establish yet another source of  domination? Democratic confederalism 
was the solution not only to the problems of  Turkey’s Kurds, but also 
a larger blueprint for a democratic Middle East, a region rife with 
conflict, suffering, oppression and poverty (Öcalan 2011).
3 History and conditions of possibility of the Rojava revolution 
In the case of  Syria, post-colonial statist development started with the 
Ba’athist regime and its socialist experiment during the 1950s, intermittently 
removing the old class of  notables from power (Hourani 1981; Khoury 
2003). With the opening, or infitah, of  the 1970s, the elite composition 
changed and started to include the ‘old bourgeoisie’ again, without, 
however, fundamentally altering the conditions of  a rentier economy, 
including all of  its socio-political contradictions (Perthes 1991). None of  
these transformations created the potential for change or the conditions for 
Kurdish emancipation (Perthes 1995). It was not until the breakdown of  
the Syrian regime in 2011, first politically and then geopolitically, that such 
conditions arose. These have now established a considerable remit of  action 
for the armed Kurdish movement in the north of  the country. 
Historically, the Syrian Kurds were hostile to the Ba’thist regime, having 
repeatedly experienced ‘Arabisation’ (Arab Belt policy) and marginalisation, 
which maintained the region’s underdeveloped agricultural status. 
Agricultural production was kept artificially low yielding. It concentrated 
on producing staple food crops, especially wheat and beans, underutilising 
a fertile area that had been deliberately developed as a ‘bread basket’, using 
landless Kurds as cheap labour (Flach et al. 2015: 244). In the river valleys, 
especially along the Euphrates, the regime’s hydro-civilisational mission 
included higher-yielding cultivation, settling Sunni Arabs where economic 
opportunities were higher. 
The valleys are now mostly dominated by IS, providing it with food 
security and taxes. Although all land has been subject to large-scale 
reform and nationalisation since the Ba’athist socialist coup in 1963, the 
rural population in general and Kurdish landless workers in particular 
(Endnotes)
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have benefited very little from any of  the developmental ambitions of  
the rent-seeking Syrian state (Perthes 1994). However, rich Kurdish 
landlords, similar to their counterparts in Turkey, were co-opted, 
becoming urbanised regime loyalists in the process. 
Neoliberal reforms opened Syrian markets to cheap imports, which 
undercut local production and led to job losses and depressed wages. 
The overuse and degradation of  land and water resources also caused 
rural poverty. The resulting rural–urban migration led to a swelling of  
Kurdish neighbourhoods in the larger cities. In Aleppo, in particular, rural 
migrants started working in low-skilled and poorly paid jobs in catering or 
construction, while property prices soared due to the inflow of  capital. In 
reaction to the 2011 uprisings that followed these drastically deteriorated 
social conditions, Assad initially planned to implement political reforms, 
but could not in the face of  the old Ba’athist militarist regime, which 
clearly preferred violence, fuelling the armed rebellion in return. After 
the structurally invested brutality of  the regime escalated the conflict, 
the preceding neoliberal reforms, having generated the revolutionary 
potential in the first place, were frequently overlooked in favour of  over-
simplified conflict analysis through the prism of  ‘social media’ (Howard 
and Hussain 2013) or ‘climate conflict’ (Werrel and Femia 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, the Syrian Kurds were part of  the uprising at an early 
stage, having already suffered large-scale killings during the so-called 
‘Qamishli Revolts’ (Gambill 2004; Noi 2012: 18) in 2004. In an attempt 
Territorial control in the Syrian civil war: situation on the ground June 2013
Source Redrawn from original by Dilek Gürsoy.
Turkey
Israel
Jordan
Iraq
Qamishli
Hasakah
Raqqa
Tell Abyad
KobanêJarablus
Aleppo
Afrin
Idlib
Latakia
Tartus
Homs
Damascus
Kurds
Rebels
Government
Lebanon
60 | Cemgil and Hoffmann The ‘Rojava Revolution’ in Syrian Kurdistan: A Model of Development for the Middle East?
Vol. 47 No. 3 May 2016: ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond’
to limit the number of  fronts it was engaged on, the regime successfully 
appeased the Kurds by granting them unprecedented citizenship rights. 
More importantly, having identified rebel groups that had formed 
around army defectors, the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA), as the 
main enemy, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in 2012 withdrew from the 
Kurdish majority areas in the north.
This tactical retreat was based on the idea that a poorly equipped 
Kurdish force would be easily defeated and was thought to be tolerable 
as an interim placeholder, especially if  kept in check by opposing 
groups, notably IS. Exploiting its own geopolitical momentum, IS 
went on to brutally occupy vast tracts of  Kurdish majority areas in the 
north, reaching the limits of  its expansion in Kobanê during October 
2015. Over time, however, the fortunes of  war changed, not only in 
favour of  IS, but also the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and 
associated Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). All warring insurgents were 
left with an array of  weapons, some of  them heavy. The Kurds even 
started to get air support from the US-led anti-IS coalition, whereas the 
SAA became overstretched, which motivated not only Iranian military 
support but also a last-minute Russian intervention in 2015 and, 
increasingly, direct Turkish military action against Syrian Kurdish forces 
and their allies in February 2016, using long-range artillery. 
What appeared as a negotiated retreat by the regime also left the 
Syrian Kurds and their relations with other opposition forces in dire 
straits, exacerbating a long-standing distrust between the Kurdish and 
‘Arab’, or Sunni population due to Ba’athist ‘divide and rule’ policies. 
The YPG’s acceptance of  a de facto ceasefire offer from the regime 
contributed to allegations that it has collaborated with the regime 
(Atassi 2014). Although Rojava is not a regime priority for the moment, 
it shows little willingness to accept de facto autonomy as an unintended 
consequence of  a tactical retreat indefinitely, as frequent skirmishes 
between the YPG and the remaining regime forces around the SAA 
bases in al-Hasake and Qamishli make clear, as well as the barrel-
bombing of  YPG-held areas in Aleppo.
Similarly, relations with the rest of  the opposition are multifaceted. 
Cooperation with the self-declared FSA units from the so-called 
‘Euphrates Volcano’ (Burkan al-Firat) coalition proved effective in 
and around Kobanê, whereas there is open hostility and military 
confrontation between the YPG and a variety of  FSA-labelled forces 
north of  Aleppo. It was in the context of  the liberation of  Kobanê from 
IS between October 2014 and January 2015, that the US-led anti-IS 
coalition developed strong military cooperation with the YPG and 
associated forces, whereby the YPG called in US airstrikes on military 
targets it identified on the ground. Having consolidated this successful 
cooperation over 2015, it led to an unprecedented campaign to 
recapture northern Syrian territory from IS. The most recent iteration 
was the US-sponsored formation of  the so-called Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) in October 2015, which went on to occupy Tishrin Dam 
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in December 2015, with the active involvement of  US special forces. 
The SDF is a multi-ethnic force under YPG leadership, which continues 
to repulse IS in areas where Kurds are not the majority population, to 
secure local support and to counter claims of  Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
territorial expansionism (e.g. Amnesty International 2015a, 2015b). 
Naturally, the geopolitical position of  a new and in many ways 
revolutionary social formation in the complex environment of  the Syrian 
civil war is difficult to summarise concisely. It ranges from open battle 
with IS, enmity towards Turkey, and ambiguous relations with the FSA 
and the regime, to a tactical alliance with the US and, more recently, 
Russia. After Turkey shot down a Russian military jet over an alleged 
airspace violation in October 2015, reports of  Russian diplomatic and 
military support for Syrian Kurdish forces emerged (Idiz 2016). 
The origins of  the uprising itself  have conditioned the more intricate 
regional geopolitics. From the start of  the uprising in Der’aa in 2011, the 
Syrian opposition, with a strong support base among the Sunni Muslim 
Brotherhood, cultivated relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Turkey, 
in particular, identified the Brotherhood as an ideal vehicle for its regional 
ambitions. The Alawite majority Syrian state class invited military support 
from its historic allies, Iran, Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. 
The wider regional confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which 
is frequently couched in sectarian terms, also came to bear on the civil 
war. These rivalries are also embedded in global geopolitical relations, 
with Russia and China opposing regime change, whereas the West, and 
the US in particular, have clearly formulated Assad’s departure as a 
policy goal, by force if  need be. This also informs their support for those 
forces in the region and on the ground in Syria that share common goals. 
A second defining regional element is Turkey and the northern Iraqi 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)’s opposition to Rojava and its 
political and territorial-military consolidation. As opposed to the process 
of  Kurdish quasi-state-building in northern Iraq (Natalie 2010), Rojava 
had vastly different socio-political conditions attached to its emergence. 
They also follow different political visions, reflecting deeper divisions in 
the Kurdish movement. 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of  
Kurdistan (PUK) dominate KRG-controlled northern Iraq, competing 
for trans-regional Kurdish leadership with the PKK (Natalie 2015: 148), 
which reflects not only geographical, but also political divisions between 
the revolutionary Marxist-anarchist ideology of  the PKK,2 following 
the political agenda of  Öcalan and Bookchin, working towards socio-
political transformation and the hierarchical-tribal developmental 
ambitions of  the KRG. 
Although some of  these deeper, historical and political differences 
have been temporarily put aside during the joint struggle against 
IS (Gruber 2015), there are other core reasons for the different 
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developmental trajectories. First, after the 1991 Iraq invasion a long 
process of  Kurdish empowerment started with the help of  no-fly zones 
and Western aid, culminating in creation of  the KRG. Unlike Rojava, 
this did not happen in isolation and therefore bears the marks of  
more conventional pro-Western state-building (Soderberg and Phillips 
2015), having been subjected to a much stronger involvement of  the 
international community and its conventional vision of  development, 
starting with the international humanitarian relief  operations in the wake 
of  the 1991 US-led invasion and the establishment of  the no-fly zone. 
This hierarchical, hydrocarbon- and, eventually, construction-
dominated path under tribal authoritarian rule is at odds with the 
Rojava model, and has led to Rojava’s isolation, while confirming 
Bookchin’s assumptions about the socially corrosive effect of  the oil 
economy in the KRG’s case. There is also a ‘Turkish embrace’ of  the 
KRG leadership and Turkey’s insistence on a form of  development in 
line with its anti-PKK geostrategic and commercial interests, which 
centre on exporting Turkish construction business. 
However, the most formidable geopolitical obstacle is probably 
Turkey itself  at its own current contradictory geopolitical conjuncture 
(Hoffmann and Cemgil 2016). Apart from a general opposition to 
any Kurdish bid for autonomy or outright independence in any of  
the neighbouring states, Turkey’s own Kurdish peace process, which 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) initiated in 2013, 
Territorial control in the Syrian civil war: situation on the ground January 2015
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broke down in the wake of  a series of  bomb attacks on Kurdish party 
offices and rallies during the 2015 Turkish general election campaign. 
In particular, a suicide bomb attack on pro-Kurdish youth in the border 
town of  Suruç on 20 July 2015, which killed 33 activists, led to the 
murder of  two police officers, allegedly at the hands of  a PKK youth 
organisation. These events initiated a renewed military campaign 
against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, including 
intense urban clashes and the large-scale loss of  civilian life. 
In light of  these Turkish domestic developments, initially favourable 
contacts between the Turkish government and the PYD quickly turned 
into hostile relations, in line with Turkey’s domestic confrontation. After 
officially declaring both PYD and YPG ‘terrorist organizations’ in 2015, 
Turkey launched a military campaign in February 2016 in response to 
YPG’s territorial advances in northern Aleppo province. In part because 
of  domestic Syrian-Kurdish politics, the KRG has closed ranks with its 
long-standing ally, maintaining a de facto embargo over Rojava. Given 
that all regional US allies also oppose the territory, it has somewhat 
curtailed open US military support for YPG and SDF forces. 
4 Rojava’s reality: a socialised polity and economy
Rojava comprises three cantons as administrative units: Cizîrê in the 
east, Afrîn in the west and Kobanê in the middle. While Rojava takes 
theoretical and political inspiration from Bookchin’s work, this is not a 
case of  a ‘to the letter application’ of  a theory, for much is determined 
Territorial control in the Syrian civil war: situation on the ground January 2016
Source Redrawn from original by Dilek Gürsoy.
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by the reality on the ground. During the initial phases of  the Rojava 
revolution, first the FSA then IS controlled the territories between Cizîrê 
and Kobanê, and Kobanê and Afrîn. This territorial non-contiguity 
partly explains the separate organisation of  these cantons.3 
In line with the theories of, Bookchin and Öcalan, the Rojava 
Autonomous Administration (RAA) went through a barrage of  
institution-building to implement democratic self-administration and 
confederalism, a form of  stateless democracy (Kolokotronis 2014), 
without directly confronting nation states militarily. This involved the 
establishment of  the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), 
an umbrella organisation composed of  constituent groups in Rojava. 
However, the PYD is the prime mover and the socio-political force behind 
the movement. Despite wartime conditions, the PYD sought to establish 
direct democratic institutional mechanisms, especially at a local level, 
from neighbourhoods and streets to the larger bodies in the cantons. 
This attempt to socialise governance and politicise social life generated 
working committees at local level that directly participated in decision 
making (Küçük and Özselçuk 2016). These institutions are crucially 
based on a co-chair system, with one male and one female filling 
all posts from the local to the confederation level. To ensure that no 
professional political and military elites emerge, key positions are rotated 
unless this poses an immediate risk. Furthermore, from neighbourhood 
to canton level, all-female parallel institutions are established so that 
the deep-seated patriarchal patterns do not disempower women, even 
in gender-equal settings, and women look for solutions to their own 
problems and needs themselves. 
Besides gender-egalitarianism, the RAA pays utmost attention to 
representing ethnic and religious groups institutionally in the Rojava 
Constitution – called the Social Contract of  the Rojava Cantons – and 
in assemblies and committees, as well as canton governments. The 
opening sentence of  the Preamble of  the Constitution reads: ‘We, 
the people of  the Democratic Autonomous Regions of  Afrîn, Cizîrê 
and Kobanê, a confederation of  Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Arameans, 
Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens, freely and solemnly declare 
and establish this Charter.’4 Notwithstanding this recognition of  
the multi-ethnic composition of  Rojava’s population, interethnic 
relations remain tense. Decades of  hostility and mistrust among these 
different communities are not easily overcome, especially considering 
the Ba’athist regime’s forced displacement of  Kurds alongside other 
discriminatory practices that favoured Arabs. 
The continuing transfer of  social-administrative functions from the 
state to the society has ensured the spread and reach of  the democratic 
process. The judicial system is a case in point. Inspired by Bookchin’s 
abovementioned notion that justice is only a bad replacement for 
freedom, the Rojavans created justice and peace committees to act on 
behalf  of  neighbourhood assemblies – that is, the commune – to deliver 
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‘social justice’ (Ross 2015). That the neighbourhood assemblies and 
peace committees act in a capacity similar to courts of  peace or first 
instance testifies to the expansion of  the principles of  direct democracy 
to what one would usually consider technical matters. 
Cases that these committees cannot resolve are referred to people’s 
houses or women’s houses, whose function is to address the needs of  
the local population in areas ranging from economic coordination 
to domestic violence. The high overall rate of  case resolution by 
committees, houses and assemblies indicates the penetration of  this 
practice among the population. More serious criminal offences, such as 
murder, on the other hand, are referred to more institutionalised courts.5 
Despite these institutional advances over the Ba’athist Mukhabarat 
(security intelligence)-led justice system, the RAA has faced criticism for 
prolonged detentions and unfair trials (AI 2015a, 2015b).
Another state function that has been transferred to society is defence 
and security, both internal and external. Responsible for external 
defence, the YPJ and YPG act as a people’s self-defence force rather 
than specialised military units detached from society. Their members 
were initially recruited from the local population on a voluntary 
basis, and they received basic training from more experienced armed 
members. In response to the more forceful IS threat since 2014, the 
YPJ and YPG have become increasingly institutionalised, and even 
introduced conscription. 
Asayîş, or Internal Security, is responsible for internal policing and is also 
composed of  voluntary elements who report directly to neighbourhood 
assemblies. External and internal security organs are not only staffed 
by the people themselves, but also report to their democratic bodies 
unmediated by a representative state, which serves to ‘unmake’ the state 
(Üstündağ 2016) that, according to Bookchin, detaches these security 
institutions from their social functions and from society. 
Although militarisation may not usually be considered an emancipatory 
act, this unmaking breaks the monopoly of  a de-socialised state over 
means of  legitimate violence, creating the conditions of  a re-socialised 
and democratised defences. This ensures that security forces are 
not placed over and above the members of  the society as bearers of  
authority; rather, the compassionate and close relations between YPJ 
and YPG troops and the larger population demonstrates the socialised 
nature of  security (Üstündağ 2016). 
Socialisation of  defence, however, has not been a smooth process. 
Amnesty International (AI) strongly criticised the YPJ and YPG for razing 
the houses of  people they suspected of  having helped IS and forcibly 
displacing them (AI 2015a), and the Asayîş for arbitrary detentions 
(AI 2015b). The RAA countered that IS was operating in its territory, 
and although it acknowledged wrongdoing by Kurdish forces, these were 
isolated and had to be placed in the context of  war against IS (AI 2015a). 
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The YPJ, as an all-female army, has also served to emancipate women 
in an otherwise extremely conservative society where patriarchy is still 
a strong undercurrent in social life, despite the huge steps the KLM 
has taken in Turkey and Syria. As paradoxical as this may sound, 
and despite contrasting experiences in the US military and elsewhere 
(D’Amico 1996), crucial differences exist between the YPJ and the other 
instances of  women taking part in war-making. First, the most obvious 
reason is that by joining the YPJ (or PKK in Turkey), women free 
themselves from patriarchal bonds and get control over their own lives. 
The alternative for most would be to get married at a relatively early 
age and suffer patriarchal domination for the rest of  their lives. 
Since the 1990s, when the KLM in Turkey saw the emergence of  
a strong Kurdish Women’s Movement that challenged and even 
transformed the KLM from within, Kurdish women increasingly 
came to play important roles in public life, especially through the 
legal and illegal organisations in the KLM, such as the pro-Kurdish, 
left-wing People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey, the PKK, and 
the Group of  Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), as well as affiliated 
non-governmental organisations in Turkey. 
Now this can be seen in Syria, as well, through ideological and political 
education. Second, unlike the cases of  the Israeli, US, Canadian or 
French militaries, where women serve alongside men, in the case of  the 
YPJ they are organised as a separate force with female commanders. 
Where patriarchy is still a strong force in society, even the presence of  
men in the same organisation with women may hinder the uncovering 
of  the full potential of  women. Third, and in a more direct policing 
capacity, the YPJ fights directly for women’s rights; in the words of  
commander Nesrîn Abdalla: 
Until now, armies were created exclusively by men with patriarchal 
thinking, so they had only two tasks: to defend and win power. But we 
are an army of  women… We do this not just to protect ourselves, but 
also to change the way of  thinking in the army, not only to gain power, 
but to change society, to develop it… we had to organize ourselves 
properly in order to deal with the feudal thinking (Sputnik 2016).
Along with the state, the market is seen as a major source of  
hierarchical social domination (Cemgil 2016). Concurrent with the 
transfer of  state functions to democratic self-administration bodies, 
socially reproductive functions are also transferred to society to ensure 
democratic control over the economy. This ‘social economy’, in turn, 
is further democratised through decentralisation and cooperative 
production, avoiding Soviet-style centralisation and state planning. 
As with the emergence of  the overall political project, geopolitical 
conditions determine the nature of  socioeconomic transformation. 
Although the KRG-imposed embargo, political and economic isolation 
are major constraints for the political economy of  Rojava, which lead 
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to shortages of  goods – especially of  medicines – and increase prices, 
they can also be seen as an opportunity, facilitating the transfer towards 
local, sustainable production. The decentralised assembly structures are 
geared to react to the conditions of  the embargo and relative isolation, 
maintaining food security, public services and other basic needs using 
local, municipal governance structures, generating what can be called 
‘economic communalism’ through cooperatives. The assemblies’ 
economy commissions deal with all issues relating to production, and 
exist alongside commissions for women, politics, defence, occupation, 
education at all levels of  the democratic self-administration (Biehl 2015; 
Ayboğa 2014b). Nonetheless, the necessities of  a war economy have 
compromised the development of  this social economy. 
Although ‘development’ has partially been adopted as a discourse, 
overarching ‘goals’ such as subsistence, autonomy, locality and 
sustainability remain core pillars of  Rojava’s social economy, with 
cooperatives at the centre of  this localised, ‘subsistence-plus-x’ 
production, (Biehl 2015). Not entirely anti-market, price caps are 
nevertheless imposed as an important tool to avoid food speculation and 
maintain subsistence (Yeğin 2015). The declared aim of  this democratic 
economy is to keep surpluses within local communities, maintaining the 
long-term ecological sustainability of  production and democratised access 
to resources over short-term exhaustion of  resources for investor profit. 
For the time being, the socialisation of  land has been circumvented to 
avoid any form of  hierarchical enforcement as a practice. Despite this, 
there is a general ideological tendency towards the socialisation of  land, 
not least due to historically low Kurdish land ownership in the region. 
Land, water and energy are seen as public goods, which assembly-led 
municipalities manage and control (Flach et al. 2015: 258). Historical 
circumstances have prevented a strong social contradiction, because the 
expropriation and transformation of  Syrian state land, which accounts 
for around 80 per cent of  arable land in Rojava, allows for plenty of  
scope for transformation towards cooperative structures after the regime’s 
departure made this land available. This not only follows ideology, but 
also the need for crop transformation and diversification away from the 
large, quasi-colonial, Ba’athist monoculture and monocrop production. 
Parallel structures continue to coexist, nonetheless, with private 
companies, cooperatives and assemblies all cooperating in the 
production process. Just as the national state and local autonomy 
are meant to co-exist peacefully, so too are capitalist and cooperative 
production: ‘Private capital/property is not forbidden but it is put to 
work for the communes/cooperatives’ (Yılmaz 2014), complementing 
one another. Private landowners and refinery owners charge 
commercial rates and the assemblies have no ambition to expropriate 
those holdings, trying to integrate them into the current war economy 
instead. A question remains over potential post-war collectivisation, 
however. Hence, the model is not ‘anti-private property’, but puts 
private property to communal use, bringing together democratic 
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self  rule in democratic assemblies with company owners and members 
of  the relevant commissions (Biehl 2015). 
Many large landowners were co-opted into the social and war economy, 
rather than confronted. Conversely, their production is not export- 
and world market-oriented but meets local demand in line with the 
requirements of  the assemblies. This, then, also constitutes a major 
difference compared to the Turkish-Kurdish regions, where Kurdish 
feudal lords were co-opted into a regime of  ‘pacification through 
export-oriented industrial agriculture’ in southeastern Turkey, which 
was not ecological, and did not provide secure employment or, from a 
2016 perspective, peace. In Rojava, 30 per cent of  agricultural profits 
from cooperatives go to the assemblies for the maintenance of  public 
goods, while 70 per cent remain with the producing cooperatives, 
frequently made up of  the families of  fallen fighters (Flach et al. 2015: 
258). Individual families can only get access to land in exceptional cases, 
avoiding the formation of  landed vested interests.
While advantageous in terms of  social transformation, specific challenges 
emerged from being a peripheral, primary commodity producer, with 
little to no processing capacities, located in non-Kurdish majority areas 
not under the control of  Rojava, further west in the country. Wheat could 
not be turned into flour, crude into diesel and so on. Some of  these issues 
have been addressed; for example, by building mills (Flach et al. 2015). 
Currently, however, around 70 per cent of  production goes into the war 
effort, making long-term planning and the transition to a peaceful society 
difficult. Neither crops nor ownership transformation are complete, despite 
the transformation having begun with the emergence of  Rojava in 2012; 
for example, by supplying seeds to newly formed cooperatives. In this 
sense, the model gets closest to what Bookchin hoped any future ecological 
society would have: a use-based or quasi-usufructory property regime. 
Ideologically, as well as practically, the imperative for all production is 
Rojava’s food security, or better yet, food sovereignty. This requires, first 
and foremost, rapid diversification and, at a later stage, crop rotation 
mechanisms as part of  ecological agriculture. Under the Ba’athist 
regime production was purposively kept low value and dependent on 
industrial means, leaving most surplus value-adding processing to areas 
with stronger loyalties to the regime in the south and west. 
Agricultural production is regionally specific throughout the cantons, 
which presents challenges to complete self-sufficiency. Whereas Cizîrê 
was historically forced to specialise in food staples, Kobanê und Afrîn 
cultivated mostly olives and fruit. The latter two have indeed achieved 
high levels of  self-sufficiency, but in the fertile Cizîrê region, artificially 
developed as a Syrian bread basket, parts of  the former state lands have 
been turned over to vegetable production for the local market. Food 
production beyond subsistence levels, such as animal husbandry, is still 
underdeveloped and dependence on imports persists, which allows 
importers to monopolise the market (Sulaiman 2015).
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Other non-agricultural elements include craft (important for 
reconstruction), commerce and manufacturing, organised in associations 
similar to guilds. This, typically, includes soap and olive oil production, 
construction, textiles, shoes, marble quarrying, and hospitality. 
Manufacturing remains decentralised, maintaining rural and semi-
urban livelihoods, as well as their non-industrial character. Unlike 
localised subsistence agriculture, these sectors are most likely to develop 
an interest in ending their isolation, because imports and exports are 
high risk and require payment of  large bribes to enemy forces. 
Although much of  Bookchin’s work is dedicated to questions of  
urbanity and ecology, property development has not taken on a 
central role in Rojava’s economy so far, though rebuilding, especially 
in Kobanê, has been considerable. The sector has started to evolve 
in response to the demand for living space in the relatively peaceful 
Kurdish areas, and increasing migration by non-Kurdish urban middle 
classes, especially from Aleppo into Afrîn (Yilmaz 2014). The resulting 
price hikes were offset by a construction boom, partially a consequence 
of  lifting regime constraints on building height. An increase of  two 
storeys can now be done at relatively low cost and cooperatively. 
However, a lack of  available finance restricts construction. 
Given that all borders of  Rojava are in effect sealed, the de facto embargo 
also encompasses access to financial markets and institutions. This also 
means, however, that foreign direct investment cannot disrupt local organic 
and social ecological development. Aid and donations from outside, partly 
from international solidarity networks,6 but also from wealthy Kurdish 
landowners in Turkey, still reach Rojava. Low-level finance is nevertheless 
needed and village banks have developed, but finance capital and interest 
charges are strictly banned, leaving Rojava as a primitive cash economy. 
Despite the focus on local subsistence-level production, energy 
resources remain a central, if  potentially controversial resource in 
Rojava. Originally, the Syrian Kurdish areas around Cizîrê accounted 
for 50–60 per cent of  petroleum production; however, as with wheat 
production, refineries in other parts of  the country carried out processing. 
Like water, Rojava considers all oil to be a public good. Cooperatives have 
been founded for local diesel production, which is important for heating, 
transport, electricity production, and not least military purposes. 
It suffers, however, from the primitive methods used to refine the crude, 
which in turn reduces the life spans of  engines and generators. The 
demand for spare parts is difficult to meet in an isolated economy. 
Although the Syrian Kurds have taken the greater portion of  oil wells 
from IS in eastern Rojava, the inability to refine oil in large quantities, 
let alone to market it internationally, has led to environmental problems 
with oil spills (Russia Today 2016). In the meantime, discussions on the 
future of  oil exploitation continue inside and outside of  Rojava’s self-
governing structures. The discussion around potential oil exports and 
revenue distribution, remains abstract as long as the realities of  the 
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embargo persist. Developing a hydro-carbon economy would also be in 
direct contradiction with Bookchin’s social ecological thinking. 
The discussion on how to implement the ‘social economy’ and its ‘social 
ecological’ foundations is in full swing. It has partly been realised in the 
form of  cooperatives built on old state land, diversified production in 
Rojava, socialised oil profits and, in turn, increasing levels of  autonomy 
in line with the ideological foundations outlined above and in reaction 
to the geopolitical realities of  the KRG-imposed embargo. Much of  the 
social economy remains characterised by the necessities of  the war effort 
though. For example, military commanders, rather than assemblies, take 
some decisions to meet short-term needs of  units engaged in fighting. 
Not only does this consume ecological resources, but the situation also 
allows ‘old’ structures to survive and may jeopardise the project of  social 
transformation. 
5 Conclusion and outlook for Rojava
The constraints Rojava must contend with range from the embargo 
and open Turkish aggression to the internal contradictions of  potential 
hydrocarbon development. The geopolitical conditions of  Rojava’s 
emergence are the defining contradiction this conclusion focuses on. The 
territory’s role in the anti-IS coalition and, subsequently, the fallout from 
the confrontation between Russia and Turkey worked in the northern 
Syrian Kurds’ favour. However, this success itself, Rojava’s more 
prominent geopolitical role, and the continuation of  a strong militarist 
element in its social experiment, which arose out of  necessity and 
ambition, could constitute a severe limitation to the territory’s success. 
First, internally, even if  a peace and accommodation of  Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy were reached, demobilising and transforming a society that 
has gained not only its freedom from domination through military 
means, but which has also transformed itself  under the catalytic 
conditions of  hierarchical militarism itself, will be major tasks. A central 
contradiction in the project is that the main target of  this attempted social 
transformation, hierarchy, is also deeply wedded to the condition of  its 
emergence through a necessary militarisation under conditions of  armed 
struggle. This is a general problem, but also one that affects other core 
aims of  the project, namely women’s emancipation and social ecology, 
which are wedded to the militarised processes of  state formation. 
Whereas women’s emancipation hinges on their participation in 
the armed struggle as a viable alternative to the continuation of  
patriarchy, the relationship between radical democracy and ecology, 
well developed in Bookchin’s theory, may be compromised by some of  
the more conventional dynamics of  state formation and development. 
In particular, the promise of  oil wealth beyond local consumption, 
generating cash flows through exports, remains a potential breaking 
point, socially as well as ecologically. Reports of  current oil spills to 
maintain infrastructure are worrying signs in this regard. Even less 
radical steps, such as organic farming, in the form of  crop rotation and 
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sustainable seed policies, are compromised, in this case by the practice 
of  domestic (petro)chemical fertiliser production in the name of  self-
sufficiency, or food sovereignty at times of  war. 
If  Rojava’s assemblies are serious and wish to avoid not only the 
environmentally but also socially destructive effects of  hydrocarbon 
exploitation, use and rent-extraction, they will have to leave considerable 
wealth in the ground to avoid the very hierarchies they aim to destroy. 
During the current armed conflict, however, a hydrocarbon-based war 
economy and mass food production are imperative. Those necessities of  a 
society fighting an existential threat coincide, if  not clash, with the delicate 
task of  generating a new social project. In sum, the main condition that 
would allow Rojava to emerge (i.e. the geopolitical conjuncture), is also 
potentially its most severe limitation, not so much externally or territorially, 
but in terms of  the process of  its own social genesis. 
Despite these potential breaking points, it is notable that this 
transformation is happening in a region where there is little hope. 
Conventional diplomacy or even military interventionism appear to be 
incapable of  overcoming a structural crisis in the Middle East and its 
inter-state, post-First World War order. The conflict lines have become 
more than complex, leaving observers puzzled and policymakers 
contending with impossible choices. The socio-political experiment of  
the Syrian Kurds and its practical implications have mapped out the 
potential for transformation, if  only in abstract terms. The social reality 
of  being elevated from landless agricultural workers to a military force 
that the US and Russia support at the same time is nevertheless specific 
and historically conditioned. In other words, the fertile ground for 
Bookchin and Öcalan’s ideas, namely the absence of  vested interests and 
historically grown power structures in the Kurdish regions, is the result 
of  years of  deliberate under-development by various Ba’athist regimes. 
These social conditions cannot be expected to exist in the same form 
elsewhere. Partly for this reason, we are sceptical about the ‘model’ 
character of  the Rojava revolution and the potential for direct 
emulation elsewhere, although some of  the progressive thinking 
on democratic self-governance, ethnic inclusiveness, feminism and 
social ecology could provide positive contributions to the discussions 
about the future of  Syria and the Middle East at large. Given the 
continued tendencies towards ethnic homogenisation and hierarchical 
authoritarianism elsewhere in Syria and the wider region, the survival 
of  Rojava nevertheless provides therefore a glimmer of  hope for victims 
of  the political breakdown of  the modern Middle East. 
Notes
1 In particular, see Bookchin (1982, 1986, 1987).
2 The PKK is one of  many regional Kurdish parties committed 
to the radical democratic objective of  establishing democratic 
confederalism in Kurdistan. It is organised under the Group of  
Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), an umbrella organisation that 
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brings together the PKK in Turkey, PYD in Syria, Free Life Party of  
Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran, and Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party 
(PCDK) in Iraq, as well as numerous civil-society organisations.
3 It must be noted that when Tall Abyad (Girê Spî in Kurdish) was 
liberated from IS and became an administrative unit of  Kobanê, 
Cizîrê and Kobanê cantons became territorially contiguous, though 
Afrîn remains isolated to the west of  Kobanê, with IS- and Jabhat 
al-Nusrah-controlled territories lying between. The SDF has been 
conducting operations from Afrîn in a push to remove Al-Nusrah 
elements in-between.
4 For a full English translation of  the Constitution of  the RAA see 
Çiviroğlu (2014).
5 A comprehensive description of  the Rojavan justice system can be 
found in Ercan Ayboğa (2014a). 
6 Given the highly effective embargo regime, conventional donor 
communities do not provide aid. Private anarchist, left-wing, but also 
liberal-humanitarian organisations provide financial and sometimes 
also direct physical help with the reconstruction effort. For example, 
see Plan C www.weareplanc.org/blog/rojava-solidarity-cluster-
opening-statement/. 
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